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WHEN PRIVACY FAILS: INVOKING A
PROPERTY PARADIGM TO MANDATE THE
DESTRUCTION OF DNA SAMPLES
LEIGH M. HARLAN
INTRODUCTION
The maxim “innocent until proven guilty” has assumed
significance in legal scholarship, colloquial conversation, and the
media; indeed, the concept resonates with American society. Its
prominence in popular and legal culture reflects society’s concern for
balancing the constitutional guarantee of liberty with the
government’s duty to secure the well-being of its citizens. The maxim
recognizes the inherent collisions of constitutional law and criminal
law, of rights and responsibilities, and of privacy and protection. In
the very nature of these ideas is the notion that Americans respect—
and arguably require—laws that offer broad protection to society
without eclipsing individual privacy. Recent scientific advances have
afforded deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) a preeminent role in
providing such protections; with the advent of cataloged genetic
“fingerprints” that can be matched to cellular material left at crime
scenes, the modern American criminal justice system has become
increasingly efficient and significantly more accurate.1 Yet current
law, which fails to mandate the destruction of voluntarily provided
DNA samples, falls well short of providing genetic privacy to
innocent individuals.2

Copyright © 2004 by Leigh M. Harlan.
1. D.H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA Sampling on Arrest, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 455, 462 (2001).
2. See Michelle Hibbert, DNA Databanks: Law Enforcement’s Greatest Surveillance
Tool?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 767, 796 (1999) (“Although many statutes make it a crime to
misuse information in the databank itself, the [DNA] samples, which contain an unlimited
amount of information about the offender, receive little, if any, protection.”); Mark A.
Rothstein & Sandra Carnahan, Legal and Policy Issues in Expanding the Scope of Law
Enforcement DNA Data Banks, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 127, 158 (2001) (suggesting that sensitive
genetic information gleaned from DNA samples could be used for illicit purposes).
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Progress in medical science has rendered possible both the
3
collection of DNA on a physically noninvasive basis and the
subsequent creation of identifying DNA profiles, which are
4
contained in massive databases. Although the use of profiles
has
enhanced
the
success
of
criminal
investigations,5
database opponents have voiced concerns about genetic
6
privacy and the constitutional ramifications of DNA sampling
and profiling under the First,7 Fourth,8 Fifth,9 Sixth,10 Eighth,11

3. See Rothstein & Carnahan, supra note 2, at 155 (discussing the noninvasive collection
of DNA with a buccal swab, which involves brushing the inside of the cheek with cotton);
Richard Saltus, DNA in Fingerprints Used as Identifier, BOSTON GLOBE, June 19, 1997, at A5
(explaining that scientists can generate genetic profiles from objects that an individual has
merely touched).
4. Kaye, supra note 1, at 461–62.
5. See People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (calling DNA technology
the “single greatest advance in the ‘search for truth’ . . . since the advent of cross-examination”);
DNA Links Convict to 21-Year-Old Slaying: Evidence Likened to “The Finger of God,” THE
RECORD (N.J.), Mar. 14, 2000, at A5 (quoting Jeanine Pirro, the district attorney for
Westchester, NY, comparing DNA evidence to “the finger of God”); Charlie Goodyear & Erin
Hallissy, Dangerous Delay on DNA: State Struggles to Gather Genetic Profiles of Violent Felons,
S.F. CHRON., Oct. 19, 1999, at A1 (describing DNA as the “greatest breakthrough in modern
crime fighting”).
6. See, e.g., Hibbert, supra note 2, at 796–98 (noting that DNA samples, which contain
sensitive genetic information, receive little statutory protection); Rothstein & Carnahan, supra
note 2, at 158–59 (hypothesizing that genetic information from DNA samples could be used
improperly by employers and insurers as well as by child support and immigration agencies);
Michael J. Markett, Note, Genetic Diaries: An Analysis of Privacy Protection in DNA Data
Banks, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 185, 222–23 (1996) (encouraging the adoption of laws protecting
sensitive genetic material); see also Allison Ito, Recent Development, Privacy and Genetics:
Protecting Genetic Test Results in Hawai’i, 25 U. HAW. L. REV. 449, 453–57 (2003) (examining
the need for, and attempts to, protect genetic information obtained outside the law enforcement
context).
7. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Saffle, 148 F.3d 1180, 1181 (10th Cir. 1998) (addressing a prisoner’s
claim that drawing blood to secure DNA violated his First Amendment rights).
8. See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried & D.H. Kaye, DNA Typing: Emerging or Neglected
Issues, 76 WASH. L. REV. 413, 417–45 (2001) (discussing the Fourth Amendment’s Search and
Seizure Clause as it applies to DNA sampling and analysis); Kaye, supra note 1, at 472–507
(analyzing, under the Fourth Amendment, the collection of samples from convicted or arrested
individuals).
9. See, e.g., Cooper v. Gammon, 943 S.W.2d 699, 705 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that
drawing blood for DNA profiling does not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination); Kaye, supra note 1, at 463–64 (asserting that collecting samples from convicted
or arrested individuals does not violate the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination).
10. See, e.g., Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 8, at 451–74 (examining the use of DNA
analysis in prosecutions).
11. See, e.g., Kruger v. Erickson, 875 F. Supp. 583, 588 (D. Minn. 1995) (holding that the
extraction of a DNA sample was not cruel and unusual punishment).
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13
Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Their admonitions have
recently assumed new significance, as law enforcement organizations
have begun obtaining, analyzing, and retaining DNA samples through
large-scale dragnets.14 DNA dragnets prompt unique concerns
because they target individuals who lack a criminal history or a
distinct connection to the crime under investigation.15 Consistent with
the nature of dragnets, the vast majority of participants have no
16
connection to the criminal activity.
Thus, law enforcement agencies increasingly find themselves in
possession of DNA samples from innocent individuals after
17
convicting persons responsible for crimes. The utility of these
samples, however, does not subside with the resolution of a criminal
investigation; rather, the information contained in the samples
remains attractive to an array of individuals, corporations, and
agencies outside the law enforcement context. It is well recognized
that DNA contains information regarding familial lineage,
predisposition to disease, and even the propensity for aggressive,
addictive, or criminal behaviors.18 Access to genetic information could
prove valuable to—and engender discrimination from—insurance
companies and employers,19 resulting in denied policies or

12. See, e.g., Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 1340 (10th Cir. 1996) (confirming the
dismissal of a plaintiff’s claim that a DNA database statute was unconstitutionally vague and
conclusory).
13. See, e.g., Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 8, at 445–47 (discussing the equal protection
ramifications of DNA profiling); Kaye, supra note 1, at 465–67 (arguing that DNA sampling of
inmates and arrestees does not offend due process).
14. Fred W. Drobner, DNA Dragnets: Constitutional Aspects of Mass DNA Identification
Testing, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 479, 479 (2000).
15. Id. at 479–80.
16. For example, in one dragnet, none of the 160 men tested proved responsible for the
crime. David Shepardson, Suspects No More, They Want Blood Back, DET. NEWS, July 24, 1995,
at 1C.
17. See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Grand, Note, The Blooding of America: Privacy and the DNA
Dragnet, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 2277, 2321 (2002) (arguing that samples obtained from dragnets
should be destroyed or returned to the donor individuals); Shepardson, supra note 16 (noting
that police planned to retain for thirty years the voluntarily donated DNA samples of 160 men
declared innocent of the crime under investigation); see also Hibbert, supra note 2, at 809
(noting that the DNA of convicted individuals who are later exonerated is sometimes not
expunged from state databanks); Richard Willing, ACLU Seeks to End DNA Dragnet in Search
for Killer in Mass. Town, USA TODAY, Jan. 11, 2005, at 6A (explaining that only one innocent
individual has been successful in suing for the return of his DNA sample).
18. Drobner, supra note 14, at 479–80.
19. George P. Smith II, Accessing Genomic Information or Safeguarding Genetic Privacy, 9
J.L. & HEALTH 121, 124 (1994–1995).
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opportunities for individuals with enhanced susceptibility to mental
illness, physical disease, or even less-desirable personality traits.
Conceivably, the release of sensitive genetic information could have
far-reaching effects, impacting placement decisions by adoption
agencies, corrupting jury verdicts, and allowing prospective spouses to
select mates based on perceived genetic advantage.20 At this extreme,
such biological determinism could induce “geneticide”: on the sole
basis of individuals’ biological inheritance, society could evict
“substandard” individuals from a range of traditions and programs
despite uncertainty that an undesired trait would ever manifest itself.
Existing jurisprudence and legislation are insufficient to protect
this sensitive personal information. Proposed solutions to genetic
discrimination include mechanisms that would limit access to the
21
information; however, these suggestions prove inadequate. The risk
20. The history of eugenics in America suggests that genetic information can serve as a
substantial foundation for discrimination. See Paul A. Lombardo, Genetic Confidentiality:
What’s the Big Secret?, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 589, 595 (1996) (“For most of this
century, the suggestion of biologically verifiable genetic inferiority was used as the basis for
sexual sterilization of thousands of residents of state institutions, laws to prohibit interracial
marriage, and immigration quotas for some ethnic groups.” (footnotes omitted)).
21. Potential mechanisms for protecting access to such information include the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101–12,213 (2000) and the Privacy Act of
1974 (Privacy Act), 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000). The ADA states that “[n]o covered entity shall
discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such
individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12,112a. The Privacy Act requires that any government agency
retaining records may not “disclose any record . . . by any means of communication to any
person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written
consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). Nonetheless, both
“the ADA and the Privacy Act fall short of extending explicit protection to asymptomatic
individuals with abnormal genotypes.” Smith, supra note 19, at 131. Because the ADA protects
individuals with manifest disabilities that substantially interfere with a major life activity, it is
purely speculative as to whether the ADA would prohibit discrimination against an
asymptomatic individual with a mere genetic predisposition for a trait or illness. Marisa Anne
Pagnattaro, Genetic Discrimination and the Workplace: Employee’s Right to Privacy v.
Employer’s Need to Know, 39 AM. BUS. L.J. 139, 159–60 (2001); see also June Mary Z. Makdisi,
Genetic Privacy: New Intrusion a New Tort?, 34 CREIGHTON L. REV. 965, 975–76 (2001)
(discussing the weaknesses of the ADA and the Privacy Act in preventing genetic
discrimination).
Additional protections are seemingly available under Executive Order 13,145, which
prohibits discrimination in federal employment based on genetic information. See Exec. Order
No. 13,145, 3 C.F.R. 235 (2000), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-16 (2003). However, not only
is the order limited in its reach, applying only to federal employees, but it also fails to create any
legally enforceable right. Pagnattaro, supra, at 157. The Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), 42 U.S.C. § 1320d (2000), is an important attempt at
limiting genetic discrimination in health insurance. Yet, HIPAA does not prevent certain forms
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of failing protective mechanisms, combined with the reality that
sample retention is unnecessary to achieve law enforcement interests,
suggests that preventing sample retention altogether is the more
prudent solution. This Note, therefore, suggests measures to fill
existing gaps in jurisprudence and legislation by identifying and
applying an alternative paradigm that precludes sample retention and
protects genetic privacy.
In so doing, this Note investigates the unique constitutional
issues implicated when law enforcement agencies collect DNA
samples in dragnets and subsequently retain the samples of innocent
individuals. Part I reviews the DNA sampling and profiling practices
currently employed by state and federal law enforcement
organizations. Part II follows with an analysis of the constitutional
arguments—premised on the Fourth Amendment and the judicially
created privacy doctrine—that have traditionally been offered in
opposition to these identification practices.
Part III introduces an alternative paradigm, grounded in the
theoretical and common law definitions of property, for considering
DNA sampling and sample retention. This paradigm identifies the
sample as the complete physical specimen that is withdrawn from an
individual and that contains a wealth of information about genetic
predispositions. It further distinguishes this physical sample from the
resulting profile, which is created by scientists and consists merely of
a numerical code representing the molecular sequence of the physical
sample. Part III establishes this distinction between a DNA sample
and a DNA profile as indispensable to the recognition of a DNA
sample as the property of the individual from whom it was extracted.
Finally, Part IV invokes this new paradigm as the basis for Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment arguments that better serve to protect the
rights of innocent individuals whose DNA is collected and retained.
I. DNA AND ITS APPLICATION IN LAW ENFORCEMENT
In the half-century since the discovery of DNA, state and federal
law enforcement agencies have come to rely on genetic information
as a central component of their investigative and prosecutorial

of discrimination in premium pricing based on genetic information, nor does it do anything to
protect people who purchase individual policies instead of group plans. Pagnattaro, supra, at
167. Finally, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17, may achieve
some success at prohibiting genetic discrimination; however, it only applies when the disparate
genetic impact involves “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” id. § 2000e-2(a).
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22
duties. By gathering DNA samples from criminal perpetrators and
potential suspects, investigators can utilize elaborate matching
techniques and systems to determine the probability that any one
individual is responsible for committing a crime.23 Once a perpetrator
is positively identified, however, police may remain in possession of
the DNA samples given by exonerated individuals.24 Sample retention
is problematic not only because of these individuals’ innocence, but
also because of the resulting availability of sensitive genetic
information and the lack of legislative and jurisprudential protections
25
guarding release of the information. The following Sections provide
a succinct review of the biological foundations of DNA and discuss
DNA’s relevance to law enforcement investigation and prosecution.

A. DNA: A Foundational Review of Human Genetic Material
In 1953, James D. Watson and Francis H.C. Crick made public
26
their research concerning the structure of DNA. Their discovery
would permanently and irrefutably alter the international approach to
27
criminal investigation and prosecution.
The significance of DNA in effective law enforcement stems
both from its widespread availability and from its capacity as a unique
identifier of individuals. With the exception of red blood cells, all of
28
the ten trillion cells in the human body contain an individual’s
29
genetic information in the form of DNA. A single DNA strand is
composed of four types of nucleotide bases: adenine, cytosine,
thymine, and guanine.30 The oft-conceptualized twisting double helix
results when a nucleotide base on one DNA strand bonds with a

22. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 43–65 and accompanying text.
24. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
25. See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text.
26. James D. Watson & Francis H.C. Crick, Molecular Structure of Nucleic Acids, 171
NATURE 737, 737 (1953).
27. See People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (recognizing the
significance of DNA fingerprinting in successful prosecutions); Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra
note 8, at 413 (“DNA typing has had a major impact on the criminal justice system.”); Kaye,
supra note 1, at 457 (noting that the United Kingdom and most continental European countries
maintain DNA databases for use in criminal prosecutions).
28. Randolph M. Nesse & George C. Williams, Evolution and the Origins of Disease, SCI.
AM., Nov. 1998, at 86, 86.
29. Richard A. Nakashima, DNA Evidence in Criminal Trials: A Defense Attorney’s
Primer, 74 NEB. L. REV. 444, 445 n.1 (1995).
30. Id. at 445.
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corresponding base on a second strand, creating multiple base pairs
31
and forming a ladderlike structure that coils back upon itself. It is
this DNA double helix that is contained in each chromosome32 in the
33
nucleus of human cells, enabling DNA replication within the
34
confines of those cells.
Greater than 99 percent of DNA is identical among humans and
35
is responsible for the basic human form. The remaining base pairs,
however, are unique to each individual and account for the physical
36
differences among people. It is these individually varying regions,
known as polymorphic loci, that are used in DNA profiling and
identification techniques.37 If the loci are identical in two known
samples, scientists can determine the probability that the samples
came from the same individual based on the polymorphism’s
frequency of occurrence in the general population.38
B. The Relevance of DNA in the Law Enforcement Context
DNA profiling and identification have become fundamental
techniques in law enforcement investigation and prosecution. The
effective matching of samples from potential suspects and criminal
perpetrators necessitates a four-stage process. First, DNA must be
39
collected at the scene of a crime and subsequently analyzed. Second,
law enforcement agencies must select individuals from whom to
collect DNA and obtain such samples for comparison with the crime
scene DNA.40 Third, the samples obtained from these individuals
must be analyzed, and the resulting profiles must be organized in a

31. Id.
32. Id.
33. JAMES L. GOULD & WILLIAM T. KEETON, BIOLOGICAL SCIENCE 121–22 (6th ed.
1996).
34. T.H. Milby, The New Biology and the Question of Personhood: Implications for
Abortion, 9 AM. J.L. & MED. 31, 34 (1983).
35. Sue Rosenthal, Note, My Brother’s Keeper: A Challenge to the Probative Value of DNA
Fingerprinting, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 195, 198 (1995).
36. Nakashima, supra note 29, at 446.
37. Id.
38. Veronica Valdivieso, Note, DNA Warrants: A Panacea for Old, Cold Rape Cases?, 90
GEO. L.J. 1009, 1014 (2002); see id. (noting that a match between samples indicates that the
suspect is potentially the individual who left the DNA at the crime scene).
39. Paul E. Tracy & Vincent Morgan, Big Brother and His Science Kit: DNA Databases for
21st Century Crime Control?, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 635, 649 (2000).
40. D.H. Kaye & Michael E. Smith, DNA Identification Databases: Legality, Legitimacy,
and the Case for Population-Wide Coverage, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 413, 414.
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41
manner conducive to ascertaining a match. Finally, government
agencies and officials must decide whether to retain or destroy the
original DNA samples.42 This Section elaborates on each of these four
stages, providing a framework for the subsequent discussion of the
constitutional issues implicated in the process.

1. Gathering Samples: Procuring DNA from Perpetrators and
Potential Suspects. The nature of DNA is such that criminal
perpetrators will likely leave genetic material at the scenes of their
43
crimes. During a crime scene investigation, forensic technicians and
specialists collect such genetic evidence.44 Even the most significant
amounts of acquired DNA, however, would be of no import without
comparison samples from potential suspects.
Law enforcement agencies typically employ one of four
approaches in identifying a population of potential suspects from
whom they will collect DNA. Traditionally, state statutes have
provided for DNA collection from all individuals convicted of violent
45
crimes. In recent years, many states have statutorily expanded their
collection parameters; several states now allow for acquisition from
individuals convicted of nonviolent felonies and misdemeanors, and
some states permit collection from people merely arrested for
crimes.46 When an individual has been arrested for or convicted of a
crime, sample collection is constitutional under the Fourth
47
Amendment Search and Seizure Clause.
Under pressure to combat crime, police departments have begun
48
implementing a fourth form of sampling—DNA dragnets. Dragnets

41. Kaye, supra note 1, at 461.
42. See Christopher L. Blakesley, La Preuve Pénale et Tests Génétiques United States
Report, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 605, 610 (Supp. 1998) (“Federal law fails to address the procedure
for disposition of the DNA samples themselves.”).
43. See Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 8, at 436–37 (discussing the range of ways in
which DNA can be shed by an individual).
44. Tracy & Morgan, supra note 39, at 649.
45. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 16-11-102.3 (2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1933 (2000);
see also David H. Kaye, Two Fallacies About DNA Data Banks for Law Enforcement, 67
BROOK. L. REV. 179, 180 (2001).
46. Kaye, supra note 45, at 180–81.
47. See Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1559–60 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the
procurement of genetic information from a convicted felon constituted only a minimal intrusion
on his Fourth Amendment rights); Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 8, at 419 (“[I]f a person is
legitimately under arrest, the seizure of the person is justified . . . .”).
48. Drobner, supra note 14, at 479.
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“are essentially warrantless searches administered en masse to large
numbers of persons whose only known connection with a given crime
is that authorities suspect that a particular class of individuals may
49
have had the opportunity to commit it.” Because dragnets typically
proceed with the consent of the individuals from whom DNA is
procured, dragnets do not implicate the Fourth Amendment.50 Should
an individual refuse to participate in a dragnet, police may comply
with the Fourth Amendment by obtaining a warrant requiring sample
donation based on the individual’s refusal to cooperate.51
The samples, whether acquired voluntarily or mandated on the
grounds of reasonable suspicion, are procured in noninvasive ways.
Most commonly, authorities use buccal swabbing, a procedure in
which the inside of a suspect’s cheek is briefly and painlessly brushed
with cotton.52 Sample procurement, however, is merely the beginning
of the analysis. Once the cellular material is obtained, the DNA must
53
be extracted from the sample. The isolated DNA is then converted
into a DNA “profile” or “fingerprint” for use by law enforcement in
54
the matching process.
2. Striking a Match: The Technical and Organizational Systems
Enabling Profile Comparison. The matching process depends only on
the existence of a DNA profile and not on the retention of the
55
physical sample. A DNA sample is the physical specimen withdrawn
from the cells of an individual, whereas a profile is merely a
numerical code—created by scientists analyzing the sample—that
represents the molecular sequence in the physical DNA.56 Only the

49. Id. at 479–80.
50. Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 8, at 444.
51. See With Suspect Caught, Task Force Wrestles with DNA Samples: More Than 1,000
Swabs Taken from Men, SHREVEPORT TIMES, June 2, 2003, at 3B (explaining that one man who
refused to volunteer a genetic sample requested during a dragnet was later ordered to submit to
testing).
52. Id.
53. Nakashima, supra note 29, at 447. DNA sample analysis typically is completed through
one of two processes: Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism (RFLP) analysis or
Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) amplification. Id. For an in-depth discussion of these
methods, see id. at 447–50.
54. Drobner, supra note 14, at 483.
55. Id.
56. See Nakashima, supra note 29, 447–50 (discussing the process of extracting DNA from
a cellular sample and converting that sample into a DNA profile).
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DNA sample contains information sufficient to discern complex and
57
comprehensive information about an individual.
DNA samples may reveal private information regarding familial
lineage and predisposition to over four thousand types of genetic
conditions and diseases; they may also identify genetic markers for
traits including aggression, sexual orientation, substance addiction,
58
59
and criminal tendencies. In contrast, as a simple series of numbers,
a DNA profile serves only identification purposes and can in no way
60
indicate information concerning an individual’s personal traits.
A DNA profile would be an investigative tool with little intrinsic
value in the absence of a system to catalog and compare profiles.
Earning the gratitude of law enforcement agencies, state and federal
legislatures foresaw and addressed the need for an overarching
profile organizational system. All fifty states have passed legislative
provisions authorizing the use of DNA databases to store the genetic
61
profiles of convicted criminals. To complement these statutes,

57. Jonathan Kimmelman, Risking Ethical Insolvency: A Survey of Trends in Criminal
DNA Databanking, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 209, 209 (2000).
58. Id. at 209, 212.
59. Kaye & Smith, supra note 40, at 431.
60. Id.
61. ALA. CODE § 36-18-24 (2001); ALASKA STAT. § 44.41.035 (Michie 2002); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-4438 (West 2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1105 (Michie 2003); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 295 (West 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-102.3 (2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
54-102g (West 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4713 (2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.325 (West
2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-60 (1995 & Supp. 2004); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 706-603
(Michie 2003); IDAHO CODE § 19-5501 (Michie 1997); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-4-3 (West
1997 & Supp. 2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 10-13-6-1 (Michie 2003); IOWA CODE ANN. § 13.10
(West 2000 & Supp. 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2511 (1995 & Supp. 2003); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 17.170 (Banks-Baldwin 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:605 (West Supp. 2004); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1571 (West Supp. 2003); MD. CODE ANN., PUBLIC SAFETY § 2-502
(2003); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 22E, § 2 (Law. Co-op. 2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.171
(West Supp. 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 299C.155 (West 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-3337
(2000 & Supp. 2003); MO. ANN. STAT. § 650.050 (West 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-6-102
(2003); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-4104 (Michie 2003); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 176.0913
(Michie 2001 & Supp. 2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651-C:2 (Supp. 2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
53:1-20.18 (West 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-16-4 (Michie 2001); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995-c
(McKinney 1996 & Supp. 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-266.4 (2000 & Supp. 2003); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 31-13-05 (1996 & Supp. 2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07 (West 1997 & Supp.
2004); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 150.27 (West 2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 137.076 (2003); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4702 (West 2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-1.5-4 (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 233-610 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-5A-12 (Michie Supp. 2003); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 40-35-321 (2003); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.142 (Vernon 1998 & Supp.
2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-10-404 (2002 & Supp. 2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1936
(2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2 (Michie 2000 & Supp. 2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
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Congress enacted the DNA Identification Act in 1994. The Act
authorized the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to create a
federal system for sharing profile information contained in state
databases and provided states up to $40 million to create or improve
their own databases.63 The FBI responded promptly, implementing
the National DNA Index System, a national database in which state
64
and local law enforcement agencies can include DNA profiles. The
multilevel system of local, state, and national databases, which
facilitates information sharing and matching across department lines,
constitutes the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS).65
3. After the Match: Determining the Future of the DNA Sample.
The final step in the DNA identification and matching process is the
66
decision to retain or destroy an original DNA sample. Many
legislatures have enacted statutes regulating sample retention.67
Twenty-nine states currently authorize or require agencies to retain
68
tissue samples after profiling is completed. In contrast, only five
states mandate that officials automatically eliminate innocent
69
individuals’ samples from state databanks. At least eleven states

43.43.754 (West 1998 & Supp. 2004); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 15-2B-4 (Michie 2000); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 165.77 (West 1997 & Supp. 2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-19-402 (Michie 2003).
62. DNA Identification Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2069 (1994) (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 14,132 (2000)).
63. Kimmelman, supra note 57, at 210. The Act also created quality assurance standards
for participating laboratories and established penalties for the unauthorized disclosure of
database information. 42 U.S.C. § 3796kk-2 (2000).
64. Press Release, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National DNA Index System Reaches
1,000,000 Profiles, at http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel02/ndis061402.htm (June 14, 2002) (on
file with the Duke Law Journal).
65. Kaye, supra note 1, at 462.
66. See Blakesley, supra note 42, at 610 (noting that procedures for sample disposition are
governed by state law).
67. Kimmelman, supra note 57, at 211.
68. Id.; see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 36-18-20 (2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102g (West
2001 & Supp. 2004); IDAHO CODE § 19-5505 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2003); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
22E, § 3 (Law. Co-op. 2003 & Supp. 2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-16-4 (Michie 2001 & Supp.
2003); OR. REV. STAT. § 181.085 (2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-640 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2003);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.43.7532 (West Supp. 2004). For a chart containing databank
policies by state, see Kimmelman, supra note 57, at 218–20.
69. Kimmelman, supra note 57, at 211; see ALASKA STAT. § 44.41.035 (Michie 2002); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 299 (West 1999 & Supp. 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-6-107 (2003); N.Y.
EXEC. LAW § 995-c (McKinney 1996 & Supp. 2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 § 1940 (2000).

HARLAN FINAL.DOC

190

2/25/2005 2:31 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54:179

70
have no policy on sample retention. The dearth of statutory
guidance in these states, and the statutory acceptance or requirement
of retention in the majority of the remaining jurisdictions, suggest
that DNA sample retention is far from rare.
States’ decisions to retain the samples of innocent individuals
71
have generated much concern among proponents of individual rights
and have produced lawsuits from innocent individuals whose DNA
was obtained through dragnets. Of the more than twenty-four
innocent men who have sued for the return of their DNA samples,
only one has been successful.72 Although the constitutionality of
retaining samples from any individual may be at issue, the retention
of a sample belonging to an innocent individual, particularly one who
was neither arrested nor the focus of individualized suspicion, merits
unique consideration. This precise situation invites a depth of
constitutional analysis not implicated by the retention of samples
procured from convicted, arrested, or suspected individuals.73 In its
scope, this Note focuses on the issues unique to the retention of
samples obtained from innocent individuals targeted through
dragnets.

II. FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVACY ANALYSES
FAIL TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTECTION
The Fourth Amendment historically provides an implicit right to
privacy that, at first blush, might appear sufficient to prevent the
retention of innocent individuals’ DNA samples. Nonetheless,
although DNA sample collection has traditionally survived judicial
review, the constitutionality of sample retention implicates a distinct
analysis and has yet to encounter substantial challenge. Recent

70. See Kimmelman, supra note 57, at 211 (noting that only thirty-nine states have codified
retention policies for DNA samples from innocent individuals and providing information on the
policies of thirty-four of those jurisdictions).
71. Jane Black, Whose DNA Is It Anyway?: Asking Convicted Felons to Surrender Their
Genetic Privacy Is One Thing. Making the Same Demand of Innocent People Goes Way Too Far,
BUS. WK. ONLINE, June 26, 2003, at http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jun2003/
tc20030626_6947_tc073.htm (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
72. Willing, supra note 17.
73. See Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1559–60 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that convicted
individuals have lessened privacy expectations with respect to DNA sampling). For a discussion
of the diminished Fourth Amendment expectations and rights of individuals suspected of or
arrested for crimes, see Kaye & Smith, supra note 40, at 424, and Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra
note 8, at 419.
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judicial decisions, however, suggest that the Fourth Amendment will
prove inadequate to guard against DNA sample retention.
A. DNA Sample Collection under the Fourth Amendment
Individuals concerned with the constitutionality of DNA
sampling have historically predicated their arguments on the
74
judicially created doctrine of privacy. Although the Constitution
does not explicitly grant a right to privacy, intrusions upon an
individual’s “right to be let alone” implicitly violate the Fourth
Amendment.75 Recent jurisprudence has strengthened the connection
between the Fourth Amendment and citizens’ rights to privacy,76
77
rendering privacy the Fourth Amendment’s “core value.”
The Search and Seizure Clause of the Fourth Amendment
provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
78
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.”
When an individual has been convicted of, or arrested for, a crime,
79
sample collection is constitutional under the Clause. The use of
large-scale DNA dragnets also survives constitutional review because,
“[a]s a legal matter, police may ask anyone to give DNA and, as long
as they do not engage in coercion or misrepresentation, the police
may collect voluntary samples for analysis.”80 An individual’s refusal
to submit to dragnet-based testing may arouse heightened suspicion,
which may be sufficient to judicially compel the individual to provide
a sample.81

74. See, e.g., Drobner, supra note 14, at 510 (explaining that the collection of DNA samples
requires Fourth Amendment analyses because it implicates privacy interests); Rothstein &
Carnahan, supra note 2, at 153 (noting that the constitutionality of DNA databanks rests on
Fourth Amendment privacy doctrine).
75. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
76. Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between
Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1756 (1994).
77. Id.
78. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
79. See Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1559–60 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the collection of
DNA from a convicted felon did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights); Imwinkelried &
Kaye, supra note 8, at 419 (noting that the seizure of an arrested individual is per se justified).
80. Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 8, at 445.
81. See Drobner, supra note 14, at 508 (“[P]olice have indicated that anyone refusing to
yield a DNA sample will likely be under heightened suspicion.”); see also Imwinkelried & Kaye,
supra note 8, at 423–24 (“If a person can be compelled to submit to fingerprinting on reasonable
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When individuals subjected to police dragnets submit samples
voluntarily or by proper court order, the Fourth Amendment is not
implicated. However, only a rote and cursory analysis would lead to
the conclusion that the subsequent retention of the samples is
similarly allowed under Fourth Amendment privacy rationales. Such
an overly deferential approach is unwarranted in light of the Court’s
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
In determining whether the constitutionality of DNA sample
retention flows directly from the constitutionality of DNA sample
procurement, the cornerstone inquiry is the scope of the initial
consent or court order. The parameters of that consent or order
dictate whether a second, independent Fourth Amendment analysis
must be applied to DNA sample retention.
Although the Court has not addressed the relationship of sample
procurement to sample retention, it has expressly recognized that the
initial procurement of a biological sample and the subsequent analysis
of the sample are two conceptually distinct events necessitating
82
independent Fourth Amendment analyses. By analogy, the initial
procurement of a DNA sample for use in solving a specific crime is an
event conceptually and temporally distinct from the retention of the
DNA sample for future analysis related to a different crime. Because
the initial procurement and the retention for later analysis are distinct
processes, a consent or court order relating to the initial acquisition
cannot extend to the retention of the sample. Therefore, unless a
court order or instrument of consent explicitly provides for sample
retention83—as opposed to the retention of the DNA profile—sample
retention must survive an independent Fourth Amendment privacy
analysis. As discussed in the following Section, recent trends in

suspicion rather than probable cause, he or she can be required to submit to DNA sampling on
the same showing.”).
82. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616, 618 (1989) (noting that
the “ensuing chemical analysis of the sample to obtain physiological data is a further invasion
of . . . privacy interests,” and holding that “the collection and subsequent analysis of the
requisite biological samples must be deemed Fourth Amendment searches”).
83. It is arguable whether individuals could give fully informed consent for long-term or
permanent DNA sample retention. When individuals consent to the future use of biological
materials, they are necessarily prevented from providing fully informed consent; consistent with
advancing scientific technology, the specimens may assume a purpose at the time of sample
utilization that was not, and could not possibly have been, contemplated at the time of sample
procurement. Ken M. Gatter, Genetic Information and the Importance of Context: Implications
for the Social Meaning of Genetic Information and Individual Identity, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 423,
445–46 (2003).
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Fourth Amendment jurisprudence indicate that even an independent
privacy analysis fails to prohibit sample retention.
B. The Fourth Amendment Fails to Guard against the Retention of
Innocents’ Samples
It is increasingly evident that Fourth Amendment protections are
insufficient to guard against the retention of innocent individuals’
DNA samples obtained not on the basis of individualized suspicion
84
The judicial “skepticism of
but through DNA dragnets.
constitutional privacy claims is especially apparent where the
challenged government intrusion is not the classic police-criminal
suspect encounter but involves planned government intrusions
without individualized suspicion.”85
For two distinct reasons, the Court’s current approach to Fourth
Amendment analysis is likely insufficient to recognize a constitutional
violation in the retention of an innocent individual’s DNA sample.
First, individuals’ privacy interests in genetic material have been
eradicated by recent scientific advances that enhance the public
availability of their DNA; accordingly, the government need no
longer provide a sufficient interest to render constitutional the seizure
of a DNA sample. Second, the Court’s jurisprudence indicates that
cellular samples obtained in non–law enforcement contexts
appropriately may be relegated to subsequent investigative usage.
1. Recent Jurisprudence Tips the Scales in Favor of the
Government’s Interests. Under the Court’s recent Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, the constitutionality of a search and seizure turns on
whether an individual has a “reasonable expectation of privacy” with
respect to a particular item and, if so, whether the government’s
86
interests outweigh the privacy intrusion. A reasonable expectation

84. See Sundby, supra note 76, at 1754 (arguing generally that the protections granted
under the Fourth Amendment, particularly “the right to be let alone,” no longer serve
adequately to limit government intrusion); see also Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data Banks:
Use Restrictions Under the Fourth Amendment, 74 TEX. L. REV. 49, 49 (1995) (“The Supreme
Court has dramatically curtailed protection for individual privacy under the Fourth
Amendment. Contemporary decisions have restricted the warrant requirement, eased the
government’s burden of justifying searches and seizures, narrowed the definition of both
searches and seizures, and constrained the ability of individuals to challenge government
searches.” (footnotes omitted)).
85. Sundby, supra note 76, at 1764.
86. Id. at 1760.
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of privacy vests when an individual has no expectation that others will
87
have access to the individual’s person or possessions. In recent years,
however, academics have expressed concern that this standard is
becoming virtually obsolete:
To maintain privacy, one must not write any checks nor make any
phone calls. It would be unwise to engage in conversation with any
other person, or to walk, even on private property, outside one’s
house. . . . Upon retiring inside, be sure to pull the shades together
tightly so that no crack exists and to converse only in quiet tones.
When discarding letters or other delicate materials, do so only after
88
a thorough shredding of the documents. . . .

Advances in science have rendered DNA ostensibly indiscriminate
from such “delicate materials” discarded in public places. DNA is
present on any item touched by an individual; it exists in hair, which is
shed in public, and in saliva, such that it may be gathered from any
used cup, straw, or spoon.89 The public nature of DNA belies and
discredits the expectation that it should remain solely within the
90
access of the individual in whose body it originated. Thus, the
traditional inquiry defining a “reasonable expectation of privacy” is
almost wholly defeated by the unique nature of DNA.
Under current Fourth Amendment doctrine, “minimizing the
level of the privacy intrusion can help compensate for a weaker
government justification.”91 When the reasonable expectation of
privacy is altogether eradicated, the government’s interest ceases to
be a significant factor in the constitutionality of a search and seizure.92
Thus, just as law enforcement’s storage of fingerprints survives
Fourth Amendment analysis because “fingerprints are an identifying

87. See id. at 1760–61 (noting that because the Court analyzes issues, such as whether bank
and phone records should be kept private, by addressing individuals’ expectations of whether
others will see and use their records, Fourth Amendment protections will decline as
expectations of privacy fade).
88. Id. at 1789–90.
89. Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 8, at 436–37; Saltus, supra note 3.
90. See Panel Discussion, The Human Genome Project, DNA Science and the Law: The
American Legal System’s Response to Breakthroughs in Genetic Science, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 401,
409–10 (2002) (remarks of Professor David Kaye) (noting that police have convicted individuals
using DNA evidence extracted from saliva left on drinking straws).
91. Sundby, supra note 76, at 1762.
92. See id. at 1760 (explaining that the government’s interest is implicated only if an
individual has a “reasonable expectation of privacy” with regard to an item).
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93

so too will the

2. Transitioning Uses: The Fourth Amendment Allows Law
Enforcement to Obtain Cellular Samples from Other Sources. The
second manner in which the Court’s Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence fails to protect adequately an innocent individual’s
DNA sample is evidenced by recent opinions suggesting that law
enforcement could permissibly analyze and retain cellular samples
obtained outside the criminal justice context. An analogy to
fingerprinting again proves instructive: law enforcement may
assimilate into its files, without violating the constitutional rights of
fingerprinted individuals, fingerprints obtained in a noncriminal
context.94 Similarly, law enforcement could integrate DNA samples
from an individual’s medical records into criminal identification
95
files.
In 1976, Justice Powell provided the constitutional groundwork
for such a maneuver:
This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does
not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party
and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the
information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only
for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party
96
will not be betrayed.

Lower courts have applied Justice Powell’s analysis to the acquisition
97
of biological samples. “The majority view is that if a private hospital

93. Palmer v. State, 679 N.E.2d 887, 891 (Ind. 1997).
94. Thom v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 306 F. Supp. 1002, 1011 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff’d sub nom.,
Miller v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 425 F.2d 1074 (2d Cir. 1970) (clarifying that Davis v. Mississippi, 394
U.S. 721 (1969), “does not place any limitations upon the use of fingerprints properly
obtained”).
95. See Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 8, at 433–34 (discussing courts’ willingness to
allow private medical centers to surrender samples to government authorities); cf. United States
v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (permitting banks to convey voluntarily provided financial
information to law enforcement authorities).
96. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443; see id. (declining to recognize a violation of the Fourth
Amendment when a bank surrendered copies of the defendant’s bank records, checks, and
deposit slips because the defendant did not own these records and because they contained
information that he had provided to the bank voluntarily).
97. Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 8, at 431. But see Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532
U.S. 67, 86 (2001) (holding that a public hospital’s surrender of test data to law enforcement was
a violation of the Fourth Amendment). Ferguson, however, is a narrow decision, dealing only
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or laboratory obtains a biological sample on its own initiative for
lawful medical reasons, its subsequent surrender of the sample to the
authorities does not violate any constitutionally protected expectation
98
of privacy.” This view assumes monumental significance upon the
recognition that most individuals consent to provide biological
samples to hospitals at some point in their lifetimes.99
A second source of DNA that may not invite Fourth
Amendment protection under the Court’s current analysis is cellular
material inadvertently abandoned in public places.
[C]ollecting DNA left in public places entails neither a bodily
invasion nor a seizure of the person. It seems clear that, in a public
restaurant after a suspect departed, the police could pick up a coffee
cup used by the suspect and, consistent with the Fourth
100
Amendment, examine it for fingerprints.

Moreover, abandoned DNA samples are necessarily at greater risk
for retention; in states without statutorily mandated sample
destruction, individual litigation is the only mechanism to prevent
sample retention. Yet, individuals who fail to recognize that their
DNA has been collected and analyzed will lack sufficient awareness
to litigate.
The Court’s probable recognition of a lessened privacy interest
in DNA and potential approval of alternative sources for DNA
collection and storage demonstrate well the jurisprudential
limitations on Fourth Amendment protections. Although traditional
Fourth Amendment notions of privacy are manifestly inadequate to
require either the destruction or return of DNA samples, an
alternative paradigm would assure concerned courts, legislatures, and
sample providers that individuals would receive protection.
Specifically, the theoretical and common law framework of property

with programs “developed by the police and a public hospital requiring the systematic
disclosure of patient records for the ‘primary purpose’ of advancing ‘the general interest in
crime control.’” Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 8, at 435–36 (quoting Ferguson, 532 U.S. at
81). If a hospital obtained data as a function of regular hospital procedures, presumably Miller
would control. Id. at 436; see also Kaye & Smith, supra note 40, at 437 (noting that Miller is not
easily distinguished from cases involving medical records, including DNA samples contained in
tissue repositories).
98. Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 8, at 433–34.
99. See People v. Perlos, 462 N.W.2d 310, 324 (Mich. 1990) (Levin, J., dissenting) (“In
today’s society, a person has little choice but to undergo medical treatment at a medical facility,
generally licensed by and authorized to operate by the state.”).
100. Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 8, at 439.

HARLAN FINAL.DOC

2004]

2/25/2005 2:31 PM

WHEN PRIVACY FAILS

197

doctrine provides an appropriate sanctuary for individual rights by
constructing an analytical foundation sufficient to prevent the
retention of an innocent individual’s DNA sample.
III. PROTECTING INNOCENTS UNDER PROPERTY
DOCTRINE: TOWARD A RECOGNITION OF PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN EXTRACTED DNA
Neither America’s forefathers nor its current elected
representatives have enacted provisions that expressly recognize a
property right in one’s physical person. In light of recent
biotechnological advances, however, this approach proves
increasingly anachronistic. Rather, a judicially or legislatively created
proprietary interest in genetic materials—even one limited to samples
obtained from innocent individuals in a law enforcement context—is
the only paradigm that provides a sufficient conceptual infrastructure
for the consideration and protection of genetic material. Moreover,
recognizing property rights in DNA samples is consistent with the
historical and theoretical underpinnings of property. Finally, the
jurisprudential challenges and policy-based concerns animating
Moore v. Regents of the University of California,101 commonly cited by
opponents of a recognized property interest in genetic material, are
not implicated in the distinct situation that arises when DNA is
procured from an innocent individual for law enforcement purposes.
A. Recent Technological Advances Challenge Traditional
Nonproprietary Notions of the Body
The Constitution fails to recognize an express property interest
in the body or body parts.102 Similarly, no federal statute governs the
103
individual ownership of genetic material. Until recently, the absence
of recognized property rights was appropriately premised on the
notion that the distinct attributes of property were poorly suited to
the human body.104 Underlying this justification was the normative

101. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
102. See Carol A. Schneider et al., Patenting Life: A View from the Constitution and Beyond,
24 WHITTIER L. REV. 406, 406 (2002) (noting that the Constitution does not recognize a
property interest in genetic material, particularly after that material leaves the human body).
103. Id.
104. See Richard Gold, Owning Our Bodies: An Examination of Property Law and
Biotechnology, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1167, 1170–71 (1995) (asserting that the attributes of
property law are not properly applied to biotechnological discoveries in the human body).
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understanding that property rights vest in those items that have
105
economic value.
Technological advances, however, are eroding the delicate
support for this argument. Currently, the law permits the sale or trade
106
of specific classes of body parts on the open market.
Biotechnological and genetic research further commodifies body
parts, generating billions of dollars of economic gain from the use of
information and materials gleaned from biological laboratory
107
studies. Even the application of DNA identification techniques to
law enforcement confers an economic benefit. By increasing the
efficiency and efficacy of criminal investigations and prosecutions,108
the government reduces the associated costs of crime control.
Although the economic value formulation of property rights
supports conceptualizing a proprietary interest in DNA, a second
ideational framework demonstrates the necessity of a recognized
property right. The human form has historically evoked debate over
its proper categorization as property or, alternatively, as the subject
109
of privacy rights. In contemporary discussions, however, only the
property perspective provides the appropriate context for an
informed consideration of genetic material extracted from an
individual.
It is precisely the recent enhancements in the usefulness of DNA
and in the ability to extract DNA from the human body that render
property doctrine the superior framework for analyzing genetic
material removed from an individual. So long as a strand of DNA
remains within the physical confines of a living body, the DNA and
110
the individual are “indivisible and inextricably intertwined.” This

105. Id. at 1172–73.
106. See Gloria J. Banks, Legal & Ethical Safeguards: Protection of Society’s Most
Vulnerable Participants in a Commercialized Organ Transplantation System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED.
45, 79 (1995) (noting that existing laws “permit the sale of human blood, semen, and other
regenerative body tissue and by-products”).
107. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 504 (Ct. App. 1988)
(“John Moore’s mere cells could become the foundation of a multi-billion dollar industry from
which patent holders could reap fortunes.”).
108. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359,
363 (2000) (discussing this debate and suggesting that “[t]he law of the body is currently in a
state of confusion and chaos”).
110. See id. at 364 (noting that privacy theory envisions the body and the person as
necessarily fused).
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111
gestalt formulation favors a privacy analysis. In contrast, DNA
extracted from an individual assumes an identity of its own. “[W]hen
the human body is fragmented from the person and it becomes
possible to disaggregate rights in the body . . . we should employ the
property paradigm because it alone possesses the conceptual
framework and the vocabulary for allocating rights and
responsibilities among all those who share an interest . . . .”112
Not only does a reconsideration of DNA as property prove
necessary in light of technological advances, but it also comports with
the theoretical infrastructure supporting property rights. Three
theories—libertarian or labor, utilitarian, and personality—have
dominated the analysis, application, and justification of private
113
property rights.

B. The Theoretical Infrastructure Supports a Property Paradigm for
Extracted DNA
Applying the labor, utilitarian, and personality theories to an
analysis of property rights in a DNA sample demonstrates that the
concept of DNA as property is consistent with the theoretical
foundations of property. However, more importantly, this analysis is
also instructive in determining in whom the property right in DNA
vests. An analysis premised on the three theories confirms that a
DNA sample—as distinguished from a DNA profile created from the
sample—is the property of the individual from whose body it was
extracted. Conversely, under the labor and utilitarian theories, the
DNA profile constitutes the property of the law enforcement agency
that created and cataloged it.
Labor or libertarian theory asserts that property rights inhere in
114
things that individuals create with their own labor. Under a labor
theory analysis, the critical characteristic of DNA is its ability to
replicate within the cells of the body. As the individual’s body is the
sole entity responsible for DNA production, the labor theory
111. See id. (“[W]hen we seek to preserve the physical integrity of the body without
necessarily permitting rights in the human body to be conveyed to others, and when we wish to
shield intimate associations but not arms-length transactions, we should adopt the language of
privacy rather than that of property.”).
112. Id.
113. Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of Cultural Property
in the United States, 75 B.U. L. REV. 559, 568 (1995).
114. JOHN LOCKE, Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT
para. 27, at 305–06 (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed. Cambridge Univ. Press 1967) (1690).
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postulates that DNA belongs to the body that created it. In contrast, a
DNA profile is distinctly a product of the technicians who extracted
the DNA from the physical sample and subjected it to the chemical
115
analysis that resulted in the profile. The profile should, therefore, be
recognized as the property of those technicians or their employers.
The utilitarian theory justifies private property ownership on the
premise that society benefits from private, rather than communal,
116
ownership of property. This theory implies a two-step analysis that
first inquires whether there is societal benefit in use of an item and
second questions whether the greatest benefit arises from private or
from communal ownership of the item.
Applying this analysis to the use of DNA in a criminal justice
setting requires preliminary recognition that both DNA samples,
which are necessary for creating profiles, and profiles themselves
bestow a benefit on society by enhancing the accuracy and efficiency
of law enforcement. Nonetheless, communal ownership of and access
to DNA samples and profiles harm society in a manner that private
ownership of samples and profiles would avoid. Specifically,
communal access to samples renders their genetic information
publicly available and, therefore, increases the risk of widespread
societal discrimination. Further, communal access to DNA profiles
could detrimentally increase traffic on the nation’s law enforcement
databases, impeding database use by the agencies that confer its
societal benefit. The detriment arising from communal access to
DNA samples and profiles reduces the net social benefit of their use
and, accordingly, suggests that private property interest in both
samples and profiles would secure the greatest social benefit.
The paradigm of societal benefit also supports a proprietary
distinction between the sample and the profile. Once a profile has
been created from a sample, only that profile remains necessary for
the DNA matching techniques that benefit society. Moreover, public
gain is maximized by vesting private ownership of the profile in the
party who can most effectively use it for the public interest; public
service agencies, such as law enforcement, comprise the ideal
candidates for this role. By contrast, no additional law enforcement
benefits derive from the retention of the physical sample.117 Because
115. See Nakashima, supra note 29, at 447–50 (discussing the process of DNA analysis).
116. Gerstenblith, supra note 113, at 568.
117. See supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text (explaining that the profile, and not the
sample, is used in law enforcement investigation and prosecution).
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retention risks engendering discrimination against individuals who
provide samples—by exposing their genetic predispositions to
118
physical disease, mental illness, or criminality —utilitarian theory
counsels the vesting of sample ownership in the individual donors.
Finally, the personality theory posits that personal property is
property that is “particularly important to the self-realization and
119
Personality theory
fulfillment of an individual’s personality.”
demands the recognition of DNA property rights and further
necessitates the distinction between the rights vested in the sample
and those pertaining to the profile. The sample, at the most basic
level of abstraction, is the “self-realization and fulfillment of an
individual’s personality.”120 Two distinct rationales require this
conclusion. First, the genetic material itself is the sole coding
mechanism for the human traits expressed in every individual.121
Second, the sample, even once extracted, has the potential to impact
dramatically an individual’s self-realization. The physical sample
contains a wealth of personal, sensitive information,122 which, if
released, could induce discrimination threatening individuals’ ability
to fulfill the dictates of their personality, such as the desire to pursue
employment in a particular field.123 Identical arguments do not,
however, apply to the DNA profile; as a numerical code, it contains
neither the genetic material essential for human development nor the
genetic information necessary to engender discrimination. Thus,
personality theory’s focus on individual self-realization requires
recognizing property rights in samples but does not support a
proprietary interest in profiles.
In its effect, personality theory departs significantly from labor
and utilitarian approaches. Whereas personality theory recognizes a
property right only in the physical sample, labor and utilitarian
theories not only support property interests in both the sample and
the profile, but also confirm that the property interest in the sample
vests in the individual from whom it was extracted while the
proprietary right to the profile inheres in the scientists who created it.

118. See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.
119. Gerstenblith, supra note 113, at 568.
120. Id.
121. Rosenthal, supra note 35, at 198.
122. Kimmelman, supra note 57, at 211.
123. See Pagnattaro, supra note 21, at 154–55 (noting the potential employment
discrimination that might result from the release of sensitive genetic information).
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C. Surviving Judicial and Policy-Based Challenges to the Property
Paradigm: Distinguishing Moore v. Regents of the University of
California
Despite the congruity of traditional property theory and the
acknowledgment of DNA as property, many scholars continue to
assert that common law jurisprudence undermines the recognition of
property rights in DNA. A significant number of academics
addressing ownership of genetic material predicate their arguments124
on the seminal case of Moore v. Regents of the University of
125
California.
In Moore, the California Supreme Court rejected, inter alia, the
conversion claim of John Moore, a patient whose cells were used to
126
create a patented cell line. The court reasoned that any successful
conversion claim must arise from Moore’s retention of an ownership
127
interest in his cells following their removal from his body. The
court’s identification of “several reasons to doubt that he did retain
128
any such interest” has provided opponents of a recognized property
interest in DNA with substantial fodder for their arguments.
Closer analysis, however, reveals that Moore is not directly
applicable when a DNA sample is procured from an innocent
individual for law enforcement purposes. Not only does Moore fail to
defeat the conceptualization of a DNA sample as property, but the
court’s analysis of the “reasons to doubt” Moore’s ongoing property
interest instead reinforces the argument that a DNA sample, in the
limited situation addressed in this Note, deserves property right
recognition.
1. Recognizing the Applicability of Favorable Judicial Precedent.
In denying Moore’s conversion claim, the court first focused on the
absence of judicial decisions holding that an individual’s interest in
129
excised cells was sufficient to support a conversion cause of action.

124. E.g., Catherine M. Valerio Barrad, Genetic Information and Property Theory, 87 NW.
U. L. REV. 1037, 1064–68 (1993); Laura J. Hilmert, Cloning Human Organs: Potential Sources
and Property Implications, 77 IND. L.J. 363, 375–77 (2002); Rao, supra note 109, at 373–75;
Michael S. Yesley, Protecting Genetic Difference, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 653, 664 (1998).
125. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
126. Id. at 481–82, 493.
127. Id. at 489.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 489 n.28.
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The sole case supporting this proposition—cited in the California
Court of Appeal decision and discussed in the California Supreme
130
131
Court’s decision —was Venner v. State, decided by the Maryland
Court of Special Appeals. The Venner court, considering a challenge
to the suppression of evidence in a criminal procedure matter,
weighed the possibility that the defendants could retain property
132
rights in biological products removed from the body. In its analysis,
the court reasoned that it was “not unknown for a person to assert a
continuing right of ownership, dominion, or control, for good reason
or for no reason, over such things as excrement, fluid waste,
secretions, hair, fingernails, toenails, blood, and organs or other parts
of the body.”133 This rationale provided the California Court of
Appeal in Moore with support for its conclusion that property rights
134
inhere in excised cellular material.
The California Supreme Court, however, declined to adopt the
Venner reasoning in Moore, distinguishing the cases on the ground
that Venner “involved a criminal-procedure dispute . . . and not a civil
135
dispute over who was entitled to the economic benefit of property.”
Notably, a DNA sample obtained and retained by law enforcement as
a function of an investigative dragnet involves, by its nature, “a
criminal-procedure dispute” and not merely a debate over the
economic value of a sample. The Moore decision, therefore, in no way
casts doubt on the Venner reasoning in a criminal law enforcement
context; rather, the Venner rationale likely remains sufficient to
justify a “continuing right of ownership” over the DNA samples at
issue in this Note.
2. Overcoming Statutory Hurdles to Proprietary Rights. After
addressing the absence of jurisprudence supporting a conversion
claim, the Moore court next acknowledged that specialized statutes
regulating the disposition of a body and its parts provide greater
guidance in efforts to decipher ownership of biological materials than

130. Id.
131. 354 A.2d 483 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976).
132. See id. at 498–99 (holding that law enforcement officers could constitutionally seize a
defendant’s abandoned feces for narcotics testing).
133. Id. at 498 (footnote omitted).
134. 793 P.2d at 489 n.28.
135. Id. The court further noted that the disparate nature of criminal-procedure disputes
and civil disputes required the conclusion that the Venner opinion was “grounded in markedly
different policies” and so had “little relevance” to the Moore case. Id.
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136
does the law of conversion. However, the conclusion that statutory
regulation of disposition either evidences the absence of a proprietary
right or eradicates a property interest is both shortsighted and farreaching.
Indeed, the very existence of regulatory statutes implies the
presence of a proprietary right in biological materials: if individuals
possessed no proprietary interest in their biological materials, such
statutes would prove superfluous. Furthermore, it cannot reasonably
be asserted that laws regulating the use and disposition of material
items eradicate a property interest in those items. Much to the
contrary, regulation acknowledges a proprietary right and merely
limits property use and disposition in an effort to advance a greater
societal benefit. Surely, it is not defensible to assert that an individual
who possesses title to an automobile, but is constrained by laws
prohibiting speeding, has therefore lost property rights in the
automobile. With respect to laws governing disposition, it is no more
defensible to assert that merchants who purchase alcohol for resale
possess no property interest in the purchased product merely because
they cannot sell it to minors. By analogy, laws regulating the use or
prohibiting the disposition of bodily materials should not be
dispositive in a decision to deny property rights in such materials.
Two acts commonly cited in opposition to the recognition of
property rights in biological materials are the National Organ
137
Transplant Act (NOTA) and the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
(UAGA).138 Both acts prohibit individuals from selling organs,
prompting opponents of biological property rights to argue that these
limits on alienation eradicate such property rights. Undermining this
claim, however, is the legislative history of at least one of these acts.

136. Id. at 489.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2000); see, e.g., Theodore Silver, The Case for a Post-Mortem Organ
Draft and a Proposed Model Organ Draft Act, 68 B.U. L. REV. 681, 715 (1988) (explaining that
NOTA’s restrictions on organ sales preempt a property interest in post-mortem human organs).
138. Unif. Anatomical Gift Act (amended 1987), 8A U.L.A. 17 (2003); see, e.g., Melissa
A.W. Stickney, Note, Property Interests in Cadaverous Organs: Changes to Ohio Anatomical
Gift Law and the Erosion of Family Rights, 17 J.L. & HEALTH 37, 54 (2002) (recognizing Ohio’s
adoption of the 1987 UAGA’s prohibition on the sale of body parts as “[t]he single most
important provision curtailing the possibility . . . [of] property rights in . . . body parts”). The
original UAGA, promulgated in 1968, was adopted by all fifty states and the District of
Columbia by 1973. In 2000, twenty-three states had adopted the 1987 amended version. Leonard
H. Bucklin, Woe unto Those Who Request Consent: Ethical and Legal Considerations in
Rejecting a Deceased’s Anatomical Gift Because There is No Consent by the Survivors, 78 N.D.
L. REV. 323, 331 (2002).
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The animating principle of NOTA was not to expressly define
property rights in biological materials, but merely to clarify that
139
“human body parts should not be viewed as commodities.”
Even if UAGA’s and NOTA’s alienation restrictions were
sufficient to eradicate a property right in some biological materials,
the acts fail to abolish such a right in all biological materials. Instead,
the acts grant full rights of alienation for certain cellular products,
including sperm cells and plasma-based blood cells.140 Two rationales
justify the distinction between the alienability of these specific
cellular products and that of other tissue and organ systems.
First, courts have distinguished between the alienability of
141
regenerative and nonregenerative body parts. A decision to donate
or sell a regenerative body part does not implicate concerns about a
transferor’s physical health, as would the alienation of a
nonrenewable organ.142 Thus, courts and legislatures traditionally
have recognized renewable tissues, including hair, blood, and sperm,
143
as property. DNA is akin to these renewable body parts because it
is also capable of replicating without end.144 A donation or sale of
DNA, therefore, does not invite concern about the compromised
physical health of an individual from whom DNA was extracted. In
fact, DNA is unintentionally shed by every individual in society on a
virtually nonstop basis.145 Furthermore, DNA’s existence in every
nucleated cell in the body assures an ever-present supply of DNA for
146
replication throughout the life of an individual. By analogy to hair,

139. S. REP. NO. 98-382, at 16 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3982.
140. Phillipe Ducor, The Legal Status of Human Materials, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 195, 254
(1996). The legislative history of NOTA evidences that Congress did not intend the Act to apply
to replenishable tissues, such as sperm and blood. H.R. REP. NO. 98-1127, at 16, reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3989, 3992.
141. Hilmert, supra note 124, at 378; see Banks, supra note 106, at 79 (discussing a proposal
that “would expand existing laws, which permit the sale of human blood, semen, and other
regenerative body tissue and by-products, to include nonregenerative . . . organs”).
142. Banks, supra note 106, at 79.
143. Id. at 47; Hilmert, supra note 124, at 378; see Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d
275 (Ct. App. 1993) (recognizing a property interest in sperm removed from the body); see also
H.R. REP. NO. 98-1127, at 16 (exempting renewable tissues from the provisions of NOTA).
144. Milby, supra note 34, at 34.
145. DNA is deposited when an individual drinks, sneezes, or sheds hair, dandruff, or skin
cells. See Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 8, at 437–38 (“The deposition of DNA in public
places cannot be avoided unless one is a hermit or is fanatical in using extraordinary
containment measures.”); Lombardo, supra note 20, at 601 (“A resourceful technician could
probably lift DNA from a licked stamp or abrasive doorknob . . . .”).
146. Nakashima, supra note 29, at 445.
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blood, and sperm, the renewable nature of DNA should similarly
shelter it from alienability restrictions and support its designation as
property.
The second distinction between biological materials that have
been statutorily recognized as property and those that have not is
premised on the unique functions of certain cells. Courts have
provided special property recognition to gametic materials
commensurate with their significant role in the creation of human
life.147 DNA serves a similarly necessary and irreplaceable role in the
creation of life. With the advent of cloning technologies, particularly
somatic cell nuclear transfer procedures, individual pieces of DNA
can be used to create new organisms.148 There is little doubt that these
scientific advances will eventually—if only from the perspective of
technological certainty—result in the ability to clone humans.149 Thus,
consistent with the special property recognition provided to gametic
materials, courts should acknowledge such property rights in DNA
samples.
DNA’s regenerative ability and its essential role in creating life
remove it from the ambit of statutes prohibiting the alienation of
biological materials; thus, even if statutory alienability restrictions
were per se sufficient to eradicate property rights, the classification of
DNA as property would survive such statute-based arguments.
Moreover, the general analysis suggesting that property rights are
precluded by the very existence of biological regulatory statutes
misconceives the nature of regulation and should not undermine a
property interest in DNA.
3. Recognizing the Inherent Personality Attributes of DNA. The
third approach of the California Supreme Court in refusing to
acknowledge Moore’s property right was to find inapplicable the
lower court’s argument that property rights in genetic material stem
147. See Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 283 (citing Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn.
1992)) (holding that an individual’s cryogenically preserved sperm were his property); see also
York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 426–27 (E.D. Va. 1989) (recognizing a property interest in a
cryopreserved pre-zygote).
148. See Stephanie J. Hong, Note, And “Cloning” Makes Three: A Constitutional
Comparison Between Cloning and Other Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 26 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 741, 746–47 (1999) (describing somatic cell nuclear transfer procedures, in which
genetic material is extracted from the cells of an adult and inserted into an unfertilized egg that
is then implanted in an adult female for gestation).
149. Katheryn D. Katz, The Clonal Child: Procreative Liberty and Asexual Reproduction, 8
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 3 (1997).
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150
from a “proprietary interest in one’s persona.” In rejecting the
lower court’s argument, the California Supreme Court reasoned that
the genetic material at issue was not unique to Moore but rather was
identical in every person, thereby eradicating any connection between
biological material and a proprietary interest in a persona.151
The persona definition of property gathers its animating
principles from personality theory, which postulates that personal
property comprises those items “particularly important to the self152
realization and fulfillment of an individual’s personality.” However,
“[o]nly by establishing a connection between the individual and a
unique piece of genetic information (and not all genetic information
is unique) will there be an impact on identity.”153 In contrast to the
cell lines at issue in Moore, the DNA samples retained by law
enforcement do not escape the reach of a personality theory of
property. Rather, because DNA, by definition, is unique in all
individuals except identical twins,154 there is necessarily “a connection
between the individual and a unique piece of genetic information”
that satisfies the Moore court’s standard for a proprietary interest in
one’s persona.

4. Comporting with Libertarian Justifications for DNA Property
Rights. Finally, the Moore court refused to recognize a property
interest in Moore’s biological materials because the patented cell line
was “factually and legally distinct” from the cells collected from
155
Moore. The patented cells were “more the product of the work
done by the researchers than the raw materials (cells) taken from
156
Moore.”
This analysis, which is consistent with a labor theory of property,
lacks substance when applied to the retention of DNA samples by law
enforcement agencies. Just as the disputed cells in Moore necessitated
a “distinction between primary cells (cells taken directly from the
157
body) and patented cell lines,” the cellular DNA samples discussed

150.
151.
152.
text.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 490 (Cal. 1990).
Id.
Gerstenblith, supra note 113, at 568; see also supra notes 119–20 and accompanying
Gatter, supra note 83, at 458.
Nakashima, supra note 29, at 446.
Moore, 793 P.2d at 492.
Hilmert, supra note 124, at 376.
Moore, 793 P.2d at 492 n.35.
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in this Note require a distinction between primary cells and created
DNA profiles. DNA samples are composed only of cells taken
directly from the body and, unlike the cell lines in Moore, are not
158
“the product of ‘human ingenuity.’” DNA profiles, however, are
solely a product of human invention and labor. This distinction not
only reinforces the notion of a DNA sample as the property of the
individual from whom it is procured, but it also supports the concept
that a DNA profile is the product of the law enforcement agency that
created it.159
5. Employing Legislative Solutions to Policy-Based Problems. In
addition to the four legal arguments discussed above, the Moore court
provided a significant policy justification for its refusal to recognize
160
an ownership interest in Moore’s cells. “Research on human cells
plays a critical role in medical research. . . . The extension of
conversion law into this area will hinder research by restricting access
to the necessary raw materials.”161 The concern of the Moore court is
significant; however, it should not eclipse the recognition of property
rights in DNA samples retained for law enforcement purposes. There
are, instead, less restrictive alternatives that balance the court’s
interest in facilitating research with the recognition of a property right
in DNA.
One such alternative approach was embodied in a piece of model
162
legislation known as the Genetic Privacy Act (GPA). In 1995, a
committee funded by the Ethical, Legal and Social Implications
program of the Human Genome Project, the Office of Energy
Research, the U.S. Department of Energy, and the Boston University
School of Public Health released a proposal for federal legislation
that would have dramatically changed the legal landscape concerning
property rights in DNA.163 The proposed GPA explicitly mandated
that DNA remain the property of the individual from whom it was

158. Id. at 492 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)).
159. See supra notes 114–15 and accompanying text.
160. Moore, 793 P.2d at 493.
161. Id. at 494.
162. GEORGE J. ANNAS ET AL., THE GENETIC PRIVACY ACT AND COMMENTARY (1995),
available at http://www.ornl.gov/hgmis/resource/privacy/privacy1.html.
163. Id.
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obtained—so long as the DNA sample was linked to information that
164
identified the individual.
165
Although the GPA was introduced in Congress in 1995, it was
166
never enacted. Nonetheless, it provides an important example of a
means by which a DNA property interest could be recognized
without imposing a chill on research. Because any DNA used in
criminal investigation or prosecution must necessarily be linked to a
specific, named individual, a DNA sample retained by law
enforcement must remain the property of the individual from whom it
was obtained.167 This conclusion does not, however, retain its veracity
in the laboratory setting. Rather, in a research setting, samples could
168
be collected, retained, and tested anonymously. Researchers could
even group together samples from a given individual by assigning that
individual a fictitious identifier that would not reveal the individual’s
actual identity. Under the GPA, the anonymous nature of a DNA
sample used in research would prevent its classification as the private
property of its source. Legislation such as the GPA, therefore, would
mitigate the Moore court’s concern by recognizing property rights in
DNA samples obtained for law enforcement without imposing
restraints on scientific research.
The preceding analysis of the theoretical, jurisprudential, and
policy-based foundations of property supports the recognition of
property rights in DNA samples collected for law enforcement
purposes. Even if this recognition must be limited specifically to the
class of DNA samples at issue in this Note, such recognition remains
a substantial victory for those individuals whose DNA samples have
been procured for law enforcement purposes. Under the diminishing

164. Id. § 104(a); Patricia (Winnie) Roche et al., The Genetic Privacy Act: A Proposal for
National Legislation, 37 JURIMETRICS J. 1, 4–5 (1996).
165. In 1995, Senator Mark Hatfield of Oregon introduced the Genetic Privacy and
Nondiscrimination Act of 1995 in the Senate. S. 1416, 104th Cong. (1995). The Senate
subsequently referred it to the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee. Id. Then, on
November 29, 1995, Representative Clifford B. Sterns of Florida introduced the same bill in the
House of Representatives, which referred the bill to the House Committee on Commerce,
Economic and Educational Opportunities, and Government Reform and Oversight. H.R. 2690,
104th Cong. (1995).
166. Ito, supra note 6, at 467.
167. See Roche et al., supra note 164, at 4–5 (noting that the GPA, which would apply only
to genetic samples linked to identifiable individuals, would mandate that DNA remain the
property of the individual from whom it was obtained).
168. In the majority of genetic research, DNA samples are not traceable to a specific
individual. Schneider et al., supra note 102, at 413.
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protection of privacy discussed in Part II, this property interest—and
the legal rights that arise from its recognition—provide a critical
safeguard enabling constitutional protection.
Part IV proceeds with just one example of the manner in which a
recognized property interest could, in practice, provide individuals
with the protection that they deserve. Additional consideration of the
following example—and the range of statutory, common law, and
constitutional causes of action arising from the recognized property
interest—is warranted.
IV. BY INVOKING A PROPERTY PARADIGM, COURTS CAN UTILIZE
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO PROTECT AGAINST THE RETENTION OF
INNOCENTS’ DNA SAMPLES
At a fundamental level, the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution protects citizens’ rights to their life, liberty, or
169
property. The Fourteenth Amendment further precludes states
170
from abridging these rights and also incorporates the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, rendering it applicable to the
states.171 The scope of this constitutional protection, however,
necessarily includes only those items appropriately characterized as
life, liberty, or property. Thus, the conclusion reached in Part III of
this Note—that the DNA samples at issue herein are the subject of
property rights—provides an indispensable foundation for Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment arguments that prohibit the government
from retaining the DNA samples of innocent individuals.172 The
Amendments provide these protections through two distinct
mechanisms.
First, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments prohibit governments from depriving a citizen of
173
property without providing due process of law. Second, under the

169. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
170. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
171. Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chi., 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).
172. Arguably, a sample provided consensually cannot constitute an unconstitutional
deprivation; however, the consensual provision of a sample does not necessarily extend to
consent to retain the sample. See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text. Part IV of this Note
assumes that the consent or court order sufficient to procure the initial sample does not extend
to the subsequent retention of the sample.
173. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, “private property [may not] be
174
taken for public use, without just compensation.”
A. The Due Process Clause Affords Greater Security to Innocents
Desiring Sample Expungement
The protective duties of the Due Process Clause are binary.
Procedural due process is “a guarantee of fair procedure”175 whereby
a state may not “take property without providing appropriate
176
procedural safeguards” to the individual possessing the relevant
property interest. In contrast, substantive due process “bars certain
arbitrary government actions ‘regardless of the fairness of the
procedures used to implement them.’”177
The initial inquiry in a procedural due process analysis seeks to
identify a particular government action that causes a deprivation of
178
property. In application, this inquiry requires consideration of three
separate issues: whether a party responsible for a deprivation is acting
on behalf of a governmental body; whether an item allegedly being
deprived is, in fact, property; and whether a deprivation of that item
has occurred.
Local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies are, without
exception, public bodies created and regulated by governments; thus,
the retention of a DNA sample by law enforcement is a government
action. That the samples being retained are the property of the
individuals from whom they were extracted is demonstrated in Part
III. Finally, courts have consistently found deprivations of property
when “a government official participated in the physical deprivation
of what had concededly been the constitutional plaintiff’s property
under state law before the deprivation occurred.”179 If a DNA sample

174. Id. amend. V.
175. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 337 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring).
176. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
177. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting the majority opinion, 474 U.S. at 331).
178. Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., 532 U.S. 189, 195 (2001).
179. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (invalidating a statute allowing wage
garnishment without notice or an opportunity for a hearing); Alan R. Madry, State Action and
the Due Process of Self-Help, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 19 (2000); see also N. Ga. Finishing, Inc. v.
Di-Chem Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (holding unconstitutional a statute that failed to provide for
due process in permitting garnishment of a bank account); BERNARD SIEGAN, PROPERTY AND
FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND LAND-USE REGULATIONS 27 (1997)
(noting that a regulation that interferes with the “prerogatives of ownership . . . comes under the
prohibition of the due process clause”).
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is property, a law enforcement agency is a government actor, and the
agency physically and permanently removed a sample from an
individual, a deprivation has occurred.
The deprivation itself, however, is not the “wrong” targeted by
the procedural due process claim. Indeed, “[i]n a procedural due
process claim, it is not the deprivation of property or liberty that is
unconstitutional; it is the deprivation of property or liberty without
due process of law—without adequate procedures.”180 The Court has
generally recognized that adequate procedures provide individuals
with sufficient notice of a forthcoming deprivation and an
opportunity to present their concerns in an effort to prevent the
181
182
deprivation. Although twenty-nine states statutorily approve or
mandate sample retention, it is unlikely that the mere existence of
such public laws constitutes sufficient notice of deprivation.183
Nonetheless, even if such notice were sufficient, there is—in the
rather comprehensive literature discussing DNA dragnets—no
intimation that individuals targeted by dragnets received an
opportunity to oppose the retention of their samples.
The Court has, however, declined to create a per se rule that a
184
full evidentiary hearing is required before any deprivation. Rather,
the Court determines the exact extent of procedure owed to
individuals with a three-part balancing test first enunciated in
Mathews v. Eldridge:
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally
requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private
interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative

180. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 339 (Stevens, J., concurring).
181. Allen v. Leis, 154 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1266 (S.D. Ohio 2001); see Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (“For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has
been clear: ‘Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that
they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.’”)(quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. 223,
233 (1864)).
182. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
183. See Menefee & Son v. Dep’t of Food & Agric., 245 Cal. Rptr. 166, 170–71 (Ct. App.
1988) (holding that an agriculture statute mandating crop seizure under certain specified
conditions failed to provide sufficient notice of deprivation when such conditions were met and
thus did not comport with the requirements of due process).
184. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347–49 (1976).
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burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
185
would entail.

Applying the tripartite analysis announced in Mathews, it
becomes evident that the state’s retention of DNA samples is
constitutionally deserving of greater procedural safeguards. First, the
private interest affected by the retention of an innocent individual’s
DNA sample is significant. Most notably, a sample contains a vast
array of personal and sensitive information186 that could engender
discriminatory treatment of an individual.187 Constitutional
jurisprudence has traditionally placed great significance on
188
preventing discrimination based on an individual’s immutable traits.
189
Just as an individual’s race and gender are immutable, so too is the
individual’s genetic composition. Indeed, not only is genetic
composition, in itself, unalterable, but it also directly determines such
traits as race and gender. It follows that courts would recognize the
protection of sensitive genetic information as a significant private
interest.
Secondly, there is a substantial risk that the privacy interest will
be erroneously deprived. In states that have failed to enact laws either
190
mandating or prohibiting sample retention, there exists no definitive
standard for determining if or when retention is appropriate.
Furthermore, the possibility of wrongful deprivation has been
evidenced even in states whose statutes provide explicit guidance. For
example, Wisconsin has failed to destroy a single DNA sample and,
accordingly, has consistently violated its own law prohibiting sample
185. Id. at 335.
186. Kimmelman, supra note 57, at 209.
187. Lombardo, supra note 20, at 589.
188. See Heather Hodges, Dean v. The District of Columbia: Goin’ to the Chapel and We’re
Gonna Get Married, 5 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 93, 126 (1996) (noting that the Court has
conducted more exacting reviews of policies that discriminate on the basis of immutable traits
with a “genetic origin”); see also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973):
[S]ince sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined
solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special disabilities upon the members
of a particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate “the basic concept of
our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual
responsibility.”
(quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)); Dean v. District of
Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“If homosexuality has a genetic origin, like race
or gender, any court . . . would have to be sympathetic to arguments that any statute forbidding
same-sex marriage should be subject to ‘strict,’ or at least ‘intermediate,’ scrutiny.”).
189. Hodges, supra note 188, at 126.
190. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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191
retention. The continued retention of these samples wrongfully
deprives individuals of their statutory right to have the samples
destroyed. It also evidences the risk of future erroneous deprivations.
Finally, courts have recognized that the government’s interest
includes both its substantive interest in the property that it seeks and
its interest in avoiding potential administrative burdens related to
implementation of predeprivation procedures.192 In the situation at
issue in this Note, there is little “substance” to the government’s
substantive interest. Once a DNA profile is created from a DNA
sample, the sample has no further use in criminal investigation or
prosecution.193 Thus, the government’s interest in law enforcement
depends only on retaining the profile. Absent sufficiently justifiable
governmental interests, an innocent individual’s right to due process
survives even if predeprivation proceedings are “impracticable,
194
unrealistic, and . . . burden[some]” for the government.
Although due process may be flexible and require only those
195
procedural protections that a particular situation demands, the
Mathews test confirms that the government must provide some
measure of procedural protection before depriving individuals of
their DNA samples. The exact determination of the parameters of
such procedures is more appropriately left to future in-depth analysis.
An analysis invoking the second protective mechanism of the
Due Process Clause—the substantive due process component—is
perhaps more simple conceptually but, in its result, no more
advantageous to the government. When the government has deprived
individuals of their physical property, a substantive due process claim
rests on evidence that the government’s decision to deprive the
individuals of that property does not serve legitimate government
196
interests. “The purpose of this requirement . . . . is to protect [an

191. Kimmelman, supra note 57, at 210.
192. See United States v. Real Property Known and Numbered as 429 S. Main St., New
Lexington, Ohio, 52 F.3d 1416, 1420 (6th Cir. 1995) (noting that, in part, the Mathews test
considers “the Government’s interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that
additional procedural requirements would impose”).
193. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
194. Allen v. Leis, 154 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1266 (S.D. Ohio 2001); see id. (“The Court answers
this defense [that hearings are unduly burdensome] by . . . stating that, if the County Defendants
are unwilling or unable to offer every pretrial detainee . . . due process . . . the County
Defendants should wait until a conviction or plea of guilty is entered before assessing the Bookin-Fee.”).
195. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
196. Daniel R. Mandelker, Entitlement to Substantive Due Process: Old Versus New
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individual’s] use and possession of property from arbitrary
encroachment—to minimize substantively unfair or mistaken
197
deprivations of property . . . .” Related directly to the government’s
interest in crime investigation and prosecution is its decision to
procure a sample, to retain the sample for a sufficiently lengthy time
to create a profile, to create an actual profile, and to retain the
profile. However, the decision to retain the sample after the creation
of the profile in no way serves the government’s law enforcement
interests.198 In this effect, the government’s decision to deprive an
individual of property with no associated governmental benefit is, at
best, incapable of serving “legitimate government interests” and, at
worst, entirely “arbitrary.”
Although the procedural and substantive analyses under the Due
Process Clause likely provide sufficient grounds for preventing
sample retention, the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause offers an
additional avenue of relief.
B. The Takings Clause Affords Additional Protection against Sample
Retention
In appearance, the Takings Clause provides a right to the
government by “allow[ing] government confiscation of private
property so long as it is taken for a public use and just compensation
is paid.”199 Conversely, of course, this constitutional mandate also
protects the individual. To succeed on a takings claim, individuals
must prevail in a three-part analysis that inquires whether a taking
has occurred, whether property was taken for a public use, and
whether just compensation was provided. Underlying these three
steps, however, is the fundamental requirement that the item “taken”
is the private property of an individual. Thus, the Takings Clause may
be implicated as grounds for preventing DNA sample retention only
by invoking the analysis presented in Part III of this Note.
1. Identifying a Taking. The first prong of inquiry evaluates
whether a taking of property has actually occurred.200 Imbedded in the

Property in Land Use Regulation, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 66 (2000).
197. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80–81 (1972).
198. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
199. City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188, 200 (2003)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
200. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426–27 (1982).
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consideration of this question is a distinction between regulatory
takings and physical occupations. If a government action is properly
justified as regulatory, such that the action merely restricts the use of
property, then the takings analysis requires a multifactor balancing
test weighing the government’s interest, the scope of the restriction,
and the resulting change in the property’s economic value.201 In
contrast, a per se takings rule applies to situations involving the
202
physical appropriation of property. Given that the retention of a
DNA sample by law enforcement operates as a physical deprivation
203
of property, it is situated within the confines of the per se rule.
Despite the per se existence of a taking, the government action
constituting that taking is nevertheless constitutional so long as the
204
government effectuates the taking for public use and provides just
compensation.205
2. The Failure to Effectuate a Public Use. When the government
retains a DNA sample—either permanently or for an extended
period beyond the creation of a DNA profile—its action cannot
appropriately be characterized as having been premised on public use
206
theory. Undoubtedly, Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,
premising the constitutional exercise of eminent domain on its
rational relation to a conceivable public purpose, failed to establish a
significant hurdle for proving public use. The Court has long
recognized the legislature’s authority to define the public interest and,
accordingly, to recognize a public purpose for a specific piece of
legislation.207 It has further acknowledged that “the means of
executing the project are for Congress and Congress alone to
208
determine, once the public purpose has been established.” Hawaii
Housing Authority granted identical deference to the decisions of a
209
state legislature and recognized the “extremely narrow” “role for
courts to play in reviewing . . . what constitutes a public use, even

201. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124–26 (1978).
202. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435–36 (discussing the justifications underlying the traditional
rule that a “permanent physical occupation of another’s property” constitutes a taking).
203. See supra notes 178–79 and accompanying text.
204. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984).
205. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441.
206. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
207. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
208. Id. at 33.
209. 467 U.S. at 240 (quoting Berman, 348 U.S. at 32).
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when the eminent domain power is equated with the police power.”
A narrow role nonetheless remains a role. The Court in Hawaii
Housing Authority was quick to defer to Hawaii’s stated interest in
regulating oligopoly and concluded that it could not “condemn as
irrational the Act’s approach to correcting the land oligopoly
211
problem.” It deemed the constitutional requirement satisfied so
long as the state “[l]egislature rationally could have believed that the
[Act] would promote its objective.”212
This approach demonstrates precisely why a state’s retention of a
DNA sample does not meet the public use requirement of the
Takings Clause. As just one example, the Alabama state legislature,
in enacting a statute establishing a DNA database and identifying
which genetic records could be retained in it, declared the database’s
purposes to include “[a]ssisting federal, state, county, municipal, or
local criminal justice and law enforcement officers or agencies in the
putative identification, detection, or exclusion of persons who are the
subjects of investigations or prosecutions.”213
If the public purpose of DNA collection is to assist law
enforcement investigation and prosecution, then the DNA sample is
214
important only as the raw material from which a profile is created.
As discussed throughout this Note, the success of criminal
investigation depends only on the profile; no additional law
enforcement benefit derives from the retention of the physical
sample. Law enforcement therefore effectuates a public use by
retaining a sample until it can create a profile from that sample. After
the creation of the profile, however, further retention of the sample in
no way promotes the government’s stated interest.
Although it is feasible that, at the advent of DNA technology,
legislatures were unaware of this important distinction between the
utility of samples and profiles, the state of current technology and
scientific understanding renders it unlikely that a legislature could

210. Id.
211. Id. at 242.
212. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
451 U.S. 648, 671–72 (1981)).
213. ALA. CODE § 36-18-24 (2001). The other purposes of the statute include human
identification efforts and the development of forensic methods and DNA quality control
standards. Id.
214. This conclusion applies with equal force to other purposes underlying DNA database
statutes, such as those articulated by the Alabama state legislature. See supra note 213 and
accompanying text.
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“rationally . . . believe[] that [sample retention] would promote its
215
of enhancing law enforcement efforts. Although
objective”
significant in scope, this conclusion fits precisely within the
216
bounds of a court’s ability to reject a
“extremely narrow”
legislature’s proclamation of public use.
3. A Final Missing Link: The Absence of Just Compensation. If a
court declines to find public use, the takings claim is successful and
the government is prevented from securing the property. However,
even if a court recognized a sufficient public use in sample retention,
the government’s retention would remain unconstitutional unless the
government provided “just compensation” to individuals.217 To
proffer just compensation as a constitutional requirement is not to
surmise that law enforcement would pay individuals for the right to
store samples; rather, the inherent unlikelihood of such action itself
serves as a sufficient restraint on the retention of samples.
In its current approach, the government fails to issue just
compensation to innocent individuals. The government has neither
218
nor conferred upon these
provided monetary remuneration
individuals any benefits in kind. Although courts have recognized the
sufficiency of benefits in kind—through the doctrine of “average
reciprocity of advantage”219—arguments advocating such recognition
with respect to the retention of innocents’ samples are inadequate.
Drawing a parallel to the retention of DNA samples in a clinical
forum, the weaknesses of an average reciprocity of advantage
argument become evident. Within the medical therapy setting,
samples are retained for diagnosis and treatment.220 In those

215. 467 U.S. at 242 (emphasis omitted) (quoting W. &. S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 671–72 (1981)).
216. Id. at 240 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)).
217. City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188, 200 (2003)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
218. There is little discussion of monetary compensation for sample donation; even sources
outlining comprehensive methods of sample procurement fail to mention financial
remuneration for donation. See, e.g., Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 8, at 416 (“Officials can
secure such samples in many ways. They can seek a court order . . . ; they can turn to a
preexisting collection of DNA samples; they can take a sample with the consent of the
individual; or they can try to locate a sample that the suspect has abandoned.”).
219. Blaine I. Green, The Endangered Species Act and Fifth Amendment Takings:
Constitutional Limits of Species Protection, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 329, 345 n.80 (1998).
220. See Gatter, supra note 83, at 441 (“Tissue removed . . . as part of a therapeutic
operative procedure . . . is used primarily for therapy and diagnosis.”).
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situations, benefits flow directly, individually, and uniquely to the
221
donors. However, in the law enforcement realm, retained samples
offer no direct, individual, or unique benefit to the individuals who
provided them. Because individuals whose samples were collected
through dragnet operations were never expressly suspected of having
committed the crimes at issue, such innocent individuals fail to
receive the benefit of exoneration from blame.222
The Fifth Amendment takings and due process analyses provide
new ammunition in the battle to protect innocent individuals’ DNA
samples from government retention. Although the analyses outlined
in this Note present only a partial review of the property-based
protections offered by the Constitution, they serve as noteworthy
examples of the protections made available by the recognition of a
property interest in the DNA samples of innocent individuals.
CONCLUSION
Unique constitutional issues arise when law enforcement
agencies retain DNA samples from innocent individuals targeted
through dragnets. Traditional Fourth Amendment privacy analysis is
no longer sufficient to protect the rights of these individuals; however,
a property paradigm provides assurance of the Constitution’s ability
to protect individuals. The application of property theories and
jurisprudential property doctrines supports the recognition of a
property right in the limited category of DNA samples discussed in
this Note. This approach recognizes a DNA sample as the property of
the individual donor and distinguishes between the DNA sample and
a DNA profile created from the sample.
The recognition of this limited property interest, and the
resulting availability of constitutional protection, provides the most
compelling defense against the retention of innocent individuals’
sensitive genetic information. Preventing the discrimination that
might result from the availability of this information is, in itself, a
significant goal. Yet, creating such protections is also a necessity for a
society steeped in privacy but strapped by current laws ill-equipped to
address advances in the beneficial use of DNA.

221. See id. at 442–43 (noting that consent requirements differ depending on whether the
extracted tissue was procured for therapeutic reasons or nontherapeutic research purposes).
222. See Drobner, supra note 14, at 479–80 (explaining that dragnets are administered on
the basis of class membership rather than individual suspicion).

